

VIEWS ON THE REVIEW OF THE MODALITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM

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Carbon Market Watch welcomes the opportunity to provide input on discussions on the review of the modalities and procedures for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – SBI agenda item 6a.

BACKGROUND

The future role of the CDM in the 2015 climate treaty is likely to be very limited for a number of reasons. From 2020, also developing countries are expected to contribute to the global mitigation efforts. This has a big impact on the original purpose of the CDM for a number of reasons 1) developing countries will want to account for their own emission reductions 2) developed countries will have to have much higher climate mitigation targets 3) emission reductions in developing countries will have to be financed in addition to climate action in developed countries.

The role of the CDM as an offsetting mechanism, or in an evolved form, in a 2015 climate treaty will be discussed as part of the wider discussion in the ADP and as part of the deliberations on the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) in SBSTA. These views reflect on the experience with the CDM to date and provide recommendations for a fundamental change of the modalities & procedures should these be used in any form in a future climate treaty.

Carbon Market Watch recommendations for the CDM Review

Achieve net atmospheric benefits

- Define net atmospheric benefit and elaborate on the specifics, e.g. that they can be achieved through, *inter alia* cancelling or discounting of units, and how such net benefits will be monitored and verified;
- Provisions shall apply to binding 2020 commitments, voluntary 2020 pledges and post-2020 contributions
- Address double counting and double claiming as a pre requisite in achieving net atmospheric benefits

Improve additionality testing

- Establish a negative list to exclude technology types with low likelihood of additionality, high risks of perverse incentives and project types where baselines and additionality are intrinsically difficult to determine
- Introduce additionality reassessment at the renewal of the crediting period

Shorten the length of the crediting periods

- Shortened lengths of crediting periods to avoid issuance of credits from projects that can no longer be considered additional
- Define the length of the crediting periods individually per project type in the respective methodology and take into account, inter alia, the rate of innovation and change in the relevant sectors as well as relevant market and socio-economic developments

Include national (E+/E-) policies in additionality testing

- Include both E- and E+ policies in the determination of additionality and baselines for all CDM projects, including those that are already registered and need to renew their crediting period

Strengthen Civil Society Participation

- Strengthen requirements for stakeholder involvement including the incorporation of a best practiced guideline for local stakeholder consultation
- Establish a local stakeholder communications channel for case specific matters, both before and after the registration of CDM project activities and PoAs
- Introduce a global stakeholder consultation at the verification stage of the CDM project activities and PoAs

Establish a CDM grievance mechanism

- Establish environmental and social safeguards similar as provided by the REDD+ framework to be applied when financing and undertaking CDM project activities and PoAs
- Introduce a procedure for the CDM Executive Board to forward concerns about social and environmental impacts of specific CDM project activities to the relevant DNAs for investigation and assessment
- Introduce best practice guidance for national effective grievance mechanisms
- Introduce reporting requirements for national level grievance processes to international bodies
- Ensure that the appeals procedure under SBI is swiftly implemented and provides for broad legal standing

Improve the CDM's contribution to sustainable development

- Require that Designated National Authorities make their sustainable development benefit indicators publicly available at national and international levels
- Define minimum global standards on sustainability and “no harm” requirements that each CDM project has to meet
- Improve the existing SD Tool by including mandatory requirements for monitoring, reporting, and verification and a robust participation of civil society in this process
- Exclude project types that support technologies or practices with high GHG emissions and that are associated with other high environmental and social costs e.g. coal extraction projects

Improve the membership and composition of the CDM Executive Board

- Establish a strengthened code of conduct for Board members
- Introduce eligibility criteria for Board members

Introduce liability rules for Designated Operational Entities

- Establish rules and procedures under which DOEs are assigned and paid by a UNFCCC body
- Establish rules for dealing with significant deficiencies in validation, verification and certification reports
- Establish a grievance mechanism for cases when there is probable cause that a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) may not have performed its duties in accordance with established rules

ACHIEVE NET ATMOSPHERIC BENEFITS

The CDM is a pure offsetting mechanism and therefore zero-sum and does not lead to emissions reduction beyond the cap. This means that non-additional credits lead to a de-facto increase in global emissions. Estimates for the number of CDM offsets that do not lead to an emissions reduction range between 0.7 to over 3 Gt by 2020.¹ Both decisions on the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) and the New Market Mechanism (NMM) from COP18 include language that calls for “ensuring a net decrease and/or avoidance of global greenhouse gas emissions.” In order for the CDM to be a useful tool for climate mitigation it must go beyond pure offsetting and provide net atmospheric benefits.

- The CDM M&Ps should **define net atmospheric benefit as achieving a net global decrease in emissions below the caps** as well as elaborate on the specifics of **how such net benefits will be monitored and verified**.
- The provisions should apply not just on binding 2020 commitments but **also on voluntary 2020 pledges and post-2020 contributions**.
- It is important to note that **double counting and double claiming** need to be addressed as a pre requisite in achieving net atmospheric benefits. Atmospheric benefits can be achieved through, *inter alia* **cancelling or discounting of units**².

IMPROVE ADDITIONALITY TESTING

The current rules for the demonstration of additionality, the proof that projects are only viable because they receive CDM support, have long been criticised as ineffective. A large number of current CDM projects are likely not additional – they would be implemented even without the incentives from the CDM. Carbon credits from such free-rider projects do not represent real emissions reductions and lead to an increase in global greenhouse gas emissions.

- **Technology type**

The technology types eligible under the CDM should be limited. Research³ recently released under the CDM Policy Dialogue confirms that large-scale power supply and methane projects are unlikely to be additional. If such projects remain eligible in the CDM, they could increase cumulative global GHG emissions by up to 3.6 Giga tonnes CO₂e through 2020. Non-additional credits also undermine the economic effectiveness of the CDM by artificially increasing the supply of credits that do not represent actual emission reductions. This is especially relevant, since

¹ See CDM Watch Policy Brief, 2011, available at <http://www.cdm-watch.org/?p=2969>

² SEI Working Paper “[Potential for International Offsets to Provide a Net Decrease of GHG Emissions](#)”, September 2013

³ Assessing the Impact of the CDM. Report Commissioned By The High-Level Panel On The CDM Policy Dialogue. July 2012. http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030_impact.pdf

the CDM is projected to be significantly oversupplied until 2020. Reducing the large number of non-additional projects therefore not only strengthens the CDM’s environmental integrity, it is also a vital step in ensuring the continuation of the mechanism. A transition away from large-scale power supply CDM projects and other project types with low probability of additionality would address the over-supply CDM credits, enable projects that truly depend on the CDM, and improve the overall integrity and mitigation impact of the CDM.

- **Including additionality assessment at the renewal of crediting period**

Currently, only the baseline is revalidated at the time of a request for renewal of a crediting period. Additionality is not reassessed. Only reassessing the baseline is not sufficient to ensure the continued environmental integrity of a project. After 7 or 14 years, economic, political and/or technological circumstances will likely have changes considerably and may therefore render some projects no longer additional.

→ **A negative list** should be established to exclude technology types with low likelihood of additionality, high risks of perverse incentives and project types where baselines and additionality are intrinsically difficult to determine (e.g. because of signal-to noise ratio issues). Project types that should be excluded are, inter alia:

- Industrial gas projects (hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23);
- Nitrous oxide reduction from adipic acid production; and
- Large power projects, including coal and hydro.

→ Additionality should also be **reassessed at the renewal of the crediting period**

SHORTEN THE LENGTH OF THE CREDITING PERIODS

The current crediting periods (10 years or three times 7 years) are in many cases not appropriate because:

- Lifetimes of many technologies are shorter than these crediting periods
- In many cases the CDM only advances an investment which would be carried out at a later stage anyhow. Such CDM projects should only receive credits for the number of years the projects implementation has been advanced.

The Technical Paper makes the argument that shortening the crediting period may reduce the overall mitigation delivered as it may lead to the termination of projects that rely on continued CER revenue. However, because offsetting is at best a zero-sum game, the discontinuation of truly additional projects would be unfortunate but it would not lead to an increase in global emissions. Furthermore, because of changes in technology, economy and policy, it is likely that circumstance will change and originally additional projects no longer are additional.

→ The **length of the crediting period should be shortened** so to avoid issuance of credits from projects that can no longer be considered additional.

→ The length of the **crediting period should be defined individually per project type in the respective methodology** and take into account, inter alia, the rate of innovation and change in the relevant sectors as well as relevant market and socio-economic developments.

CONSIDER NATIONAL (E+/E-) POLICIES NEED IN ADDITIONALITY TESTING

How to consider national policies in baseline and additionality determination has been a controversial issue since the early days of the CDM.

E- policies: If a country's new policies that support climate friendly technologies – so called “E-“ policies – were included in the baseline and additionality assessment of CDM projects, then this would reduce the potential for generating Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). It was thought that this would create a perverse incentive for countries to not implement such policies. This is why the Board decided that such policies can be excluded from the baseline and additionality determination. In 2012 the Board decided at EB70 that, for the purposes of investment analysis for additionality assessment, the benefits of an E- policy (i.e. a new feed-in tariff) could only be excluded for the first seven years after implementation of the policy. The EB has not decided how to apply this new E- policy to baseline determination.

Yet there is a strong case for considering all E- policies in both baselines and additionality and not allow for a 7 year hiatus. Research and experience show that the risk of perverse incentives is considerably lower than it was previously, while the risk of over-crediting is substantial. In addition, with the introduction of new carbon market mechanisms and international support for NAMAs, the potential for double counting mitigation efforts is greater, particularly if the CDM rules exclude consideration of these new policies.

E+ policies: If a host country introduced policies to provide support to emissions intensive technologies, this would increase baseline emissions and CERs, providing an incentive for host countries to support technologies that would actually increase their greenhouse gas emissions.

Current CDM rules state that E+ policies implemented before 11 December 1997 can be taken into account when developing the baseline scenario. Because a new E+ policy (e.g. tax breaks for oil and gas exploration) would increase baseline emissions, excluding this policy not only reduces perverse incentives but also reduces the risk of over-crediting. Excluding them from baseline and additionality assessment would provide significant benefits to environmental integrity.

→ **Both E- and E+ policies should be included in the determination of additionality and baselines** for all CDM projects, including those that are already registered and need to renew their crediting period.

STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

Although stakeholder consultation is a key requirement in the CDM registration process, project developers and Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) lack clear criteria or guidance on how to conduct and validate stakeholder consultations. In many cases, peoples and communities that are directly affected are not adequately informed about CDM project activities or programme of activities (PoA) and their potential on-the-ground impacts.

Current CDM stakeholder consultation requirements are insufficient as they are poorly defined, regulated and documented. There are dozens of instances where projects were registered despite insufficient stakeholder participation, strong local opposition and clear evidence that the projects cause harm to the local populations and/or ecosystem.

As a step to address this shortcoming, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol adopted in Warsaw decision 3/CMP.9 para 20 which requests *“the CDM Executive Board, with the support of the secretariat, to collaborate with the Designated National Authorities Forum on collecting and making available, on the UNFCCC clean development mechanism website, information on practices conducted for local stakeholder consultations, and to provide technical assistance to designated national authorities, upon their request, for the development of guidelines for local stakeholder consultation in their countries.”*

Despite this decision by the CMP, and earlier decisions to *“develop and implement modalities and procedures with a view to enhancing direct communication with stakeholders and project proponents”* (Decision 2/CMP.5), the CDM Board has not taken sufficient action to address the shortcomings of the current stakeholder consultation rules. To date, only the Brazil has uploaded its local stakeholder consultation guidelines. However, a lot more could be done, for example a closer collaboration with processes that carry out similar exercises, such as the UN Special Rapporteur for the environment and human rights who’s mandate includes identifying best practices relating to the use of human rights obligations to strengthen environmental policy making.

This lack of action risks that DNAs may not act upon this important CMP decision. The revised CDM M&Ps should therefore recognize the need for improved guidance and incorporate best practice guidelines for local stakeholder consultation developed by the CDM Board as part of this process in the revised M&Ps.

Improved communications channel

In addition to shortcomings in the notice and comment processes, there is no means for stakeholders to raise concerns once a project is registered even if adverse impacts occur during project implementation. The current rules do not provide a formal opportunity to provide comments after the global stakeholder consultation. This means that it is currently impossible to submit comments about a specific project, e.g. if comments submitted during the local or global stakeholder consultation process have not been validated adequately or if concerns appear after the global stakeholder consultation. This is not only relevant for projects during the validation stage but also for projects during their implementation. A formal communications channel for project specific matters would allow reviewing and addressing concerns efficiently and by doing so avoiding escalation of issues. Allowing comments at an early stage in the process, when they can still be taken into account for decisions related to registration or issuance of credits could help avoid potential future appeals.

We welcome the proposed change of the technical report section F 2(d) (i), that the CDM modalities and procedures shall introduce a provision allowing the Board and the secretariat to receive information on complaints regarding issues that are not related to the emission reductions or removal enhancements of a registered CDM project activity or PoA. Such a communications channel for project specific comments should be modeled after the already successfully implemented communications channel for policy matters. In addition, a global stakeholder consultation process at the verification stage after the registration period as proposed in the technical paper section F 2(d) (ii)) would be a positive additional improvement as it would allow comments from stakeholder to follow up on earlier comments made through the local and global stakeholder consultations, it would also provide a crucial opportunity for DNAs to receive additional information about the implementation of CDM project or PoA. However, both improvements are necessary because a global stakeholder consultation during the verification period is only a punctual opportunity which does not replace a more flexible communications channel for case specific matters.

It is also worth mentioning that under the current public participation rules for the CDM, no formal channels between local stakeholders and the Designated National Authorities (DNAs) exist. Prior to registration, comments from the local stakeholder consultation are received by the project proponent, and comments through the global stakeholder consultation are received by the Designated Operational Entity (DOE). Given that it is up to the DNA to maintain the approval of CDM projects and PoAs, and the confirmation that they contribute to sustainable development, comments received through the project specific communications channel should be forwarded to the relevant DNA.

- The requirements for stakeholder involvement should strengthen including the **incorporation of a best practiced guideline for local stakeholder consultation**;
- A **local stakeholder communications channel for case specific matters** should be established, both before and after the registration of CDM project activities and PoAs;
- A **global stakeholder consultation at the verification stage** of the CDM project activities and PoAs shall be introduced

For recommendations to operationalise these changes, see our submission on Views on suggested changes to the Modalities and Procedures (M&Ps) for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)⁴.

ESTABLISH A CDM GRIEVANCE MECHANISM

There is currently no means for civil society to raise concerns once a project is registered. As more than 8.000 CDM project activities and PoAs are currently registered and will be operational for many years to come it is necessary to introduce a robust public participation process including additional case specific commenting opportunities after the project registration. In addition a grievance mechanism to ensure that adverse impacts that occur during project implementation are addressed is needed. A grievance mechanism is an essential opportunity to address community-based grievances before disputes escalate or create conflict between stakeholders and project participants.

Under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) Parties have been considering an appeals procedure for decisions of the CDM Executive Board since its 34th session in June 2011. An appeals procedure in the CDM project approval process presents a crucial opportunity for the Executive Board (EB) to secure human rights and to promote enhanced accountability, legitimacy and public trust in and acceptance of the CDM as a valid tool for reaching its goals under the Kyoto Protocol – namely, mitigating global climate change while promoting sustainable development. However, for the past three years, this development has been stalled by disagreement over the scope of the potential appeal and the legal standing, e.g. whether an appeal could be launched against both positive as well as negative decisions of the CDM Executive Board, and whether only project proponents or also affected stakeholders shall be eligible to launch an appeal.

⁴<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/views-on-suggested-changes-to-the-modalities-and-procedures-mps-for-the-clean-development-mechanism-cdm/>

While developments on the CDM appeals have been slow, it is important to note that the current scope of the appeals procedure would only assess compliance with the CDM modalities and procedures. However, even if adopted, this narrow scope does not address the social and environmental impacts of CDM project activities and PoAs that occur in compliance with CDM procedural rules but in violation of national or other international norms.

- **Establish environmental and social safeguards** similar as provided by the REDD+ framework to be applied when financing and undertaking CDM project activities and PoAs;
- Introduce a **procedure for the CDM Executive Board to forward concerns about social and environmental impacts of specific CDM project activities to the relevant DNAs** for investigation and assessment;
- Introduce best **practice guidance for national effective grievance mechanisms**;
- Introduce **reporting requirements for national level grievance processes to international bodies**;
- Ensure that the **appeals procedure under SBI is swiftly implemented** and provides for broad legal standing;

For detailed recommendations and examples of existing grievance mechanisms, see our submission on Views on suggested changes to the Modalities and Procedures (M&Ps) for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)⁵.

IMPROVE THE CDM'S CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The CDM has two main objectives – achieving cost-effective emission reductions and achieving sustainable development in the host countries. It is up to the Designated National Authority (DNA) in each host country to define the sustainable development criteria and to approve that a given CDM project activity or PoA contributes to sustainable development. This stipulates an important role for the DNAs in the sustainable development contribution of CDM projects and provides a crucial opportunity to build on this role to improve the current contribution to sustainable development.

- **Clarifying the roles of designated national authorities**

A lack of clarity on the role of the DNA has posed challenges to CDM process. A new section in the CDM M&Ps should set out the key roles of DNAs participating in the CDM and the principles that apply.

- **Increasing transparency at the designated national authority level**

Particularly with regards to the criteria for sustainable development, there is a lack of transparency and lack of consistency as to the national requirements in this context. For example, some countries apply processes that involve members of civil society for the approval decision of CDM project activities, other countries already require CDM project proponents to implement sustainable development action plans. Also as regards the national requirements for environmental impact assessments are very different, e.g. some countries do not require environmental impact assessments for renewable energy technologies even if the large scale naturally will have environmental impacts. This lack of transparency causes difficulties to understand applicable requirements for

⁵<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/views-on-suggested-changes-to-the-modalities-and-procedures-mps-for-the-clean-development-mechanism-cdm/>

CDM projects. The M&Ps should therefore include a requirements for DNAs to make publicly available at national and international level and maintain up-to-date information relating to the following issues:

- Process and criteria for approval/authorization of project activities and PoAs and for participation of civil society in this process;
- Criteria used by the DNA to assess the contribution of a project activity or PoA to sustainable development;
- The relevant laws, regulations and guidelines that apply to the national approval processes, including elements such as the applicable rules relating to environmental impact assessment and local stakeholder consultation;
- Reports about the sustainable development action plans of CDM projects as required by national legislation;
- The national Grievance Resolution Mechanisms available for people affected by CDM projects;
- The communication channels available between local stakeholders and the DNA;

- **Elaborating the key principles for withdrawing letters of approval**

To provide transparency and clarity about the procedure to withdraw letters of approval, the revised M&Ps should include key principles for the withdrawal or suspension of letters of approvals of CDM project activities and PoAs, including a high level of transparency about those principles. These principles should include the event that CDM projects do not meet sustainable development indicators at any stage during the project cycle, or violate applicable environmental, health, labour and human rights standards, laws and policies;

- **Monitoring the contribution of sustainable development benefits**

The need for monitoring, reporting, and verification of compliance with CDM rules and procedures, in particular, as they relate to the contribution of CDM projects to sustainable development have been highlighted many times. Experience has shown that the lack of monitoring, reporting, and verification of claimed sustainability benefits has led to the registration of CDM projects that have no contribution to sustainable development and sometimes even negative impacts. Monitoring, reporting, and verification of the environmental, social, and economic impacts of CDM activities at the international level is essential to protect the rights and interests of project-affected peoples and communities, as well as to uphold the CDM's stated purpose of achieving sustainable development.

In 2012, the CDM Executive Board has adopted a voluntary reporting tool (SD Tool) to highlight the sustainable development benefits of CDM projects. We welcome this tool as a step in the right direction. However, the absence of monitoring and verification, as well as its voluntary nature and access to only project participants and coordinating/managing entities (CMEs), limit its ability to fully serve this essential function. Furthermore, the tool does not require a sufficient level of detail to enable effective evaluation of whether a project participant or CME complied with "do no harm" safeguard principles or whether stakeholders had opportunities for meaningful engagement in the consultation process.

Stakeholder comments are a key source of information to know about potential negative impacts of CDM projects as reflected in the draft voluntary tool for highlighting the co-benefits of CDM projects at EB68, Annex 22. To

strengthen civil society participation in the CDM process local stakeholders should have a formal communication channel to DNAs. DNAs may request project proponents to update the SDC report at any time during project implementation, should the SD benefits or negative impacts have changed since registration of the project.

- Require that Designated National Authorities make their **sustainable development benefit indicators publicly available at national and international levels**;
- Define **minimum global standards on sustainability and “no harm” requirements** that each CDM project has to meet;
- **Improve the existing SD Tool** by including
 - Mandatory requirements for monitoring, reporting, and verification
 - Do-not harm principles
 - A robust participation of civil society in this process
- **Exclude project types** that support technologies or practices with high GHG emissions and that are associated with other high environmental and social costs (e.g. projects that support the extraction and use of coal)

IMPROVE THE MEMBERSHIP AND COMPOSITION OF THE CDM EXECUTIVE BOARD

There is little clarity about the procedure behind the nomination process to CDM Board members. While targeted information to governments may help to allow otherwise under-represented regions to nominate potential members, a reassessment of the election process is needed. In order to prevent potential conflicts of interests, nominations from representatives with vested interest in the CDM should not be allowed.

Moreover, due to complex economic data to be analyzed and the technical character of CDM projects, the selection criteria for EB members should focus both, on technical expertise as well as national representation⁶. Technical expertise is essential to provide better safeguards to ensure real emission reductions.

Due to the large number of individual case decisions and their high technical character, a technical committee for methodologies and a Registration and Issuance Team were established to provide long-term support to EB members. We acknowledge the paramount work these two bodies are doing. Yet, serious concerns persist on the decisions taken on the basis of the recommendations provided by these bodies to the EB. Although a code of conduct has been adopted, the code does not provide for the independency needed because it leaves it up to individual Board members to declare whether they have a conflict of interest or not.

- **A strengthened code of conduct for CDM Executive Board members.** This code of conduct should clarify what constitutes a conflict of interest and ensure that Board members do not participate in discussion and decisions where they may have a conflict of interest.
- **Eligibility criteria for CDM Executive Board members** that do not allow individuals from a Designated National Authority (DNA), a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) or for a public or private institution that develops CDM projects or purchases or trades CERs. In support of this, a study⁷ has shown that membership

⁶ See also Streck (2007: 98); von Ungerer et al. (2009)

⁷ Florens Flues, Axel Michaelowa, Katja Michaelowa (2008). UN approval of greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries: The political economy of the CDM Executive Board.

of the countries having a representative on the Board raises the chances for projects from that country to be approved.

- If **participation of civil society or the private sector at Board level is considered**, it must be ensured that sufficient funds are available for civil society representatives to be able to meaningfully participate and prepare for CDM Executive Board meetings. Without sufficient funds available, an unfair advantage would be given to private sector representation.

INTRODUCE LIABILITY RULES FOR DESIGNATED OPERATIONAL ENTITIES

Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) are currently chosen and paid by the project’s developer. This can put pressure on auditors to approve projects and work quickly in order to preserve their business relationships with the developers. This compromises the auditors’ independence and neutrality. According to Decision 3/CMP.1 (Marrakech Accords – Modalities and Procedures for a CDM) a DOE shall acquire and transfer CERs for cancellation if a review reveals that “significant” deficiencies in validation, verification and certification reports issued by that DOE resulted in excess CERs, thus endangering the integrity of the CDM. Although a draft procedure (annex 28 to report EB-69) was submitted for adoption at CMP8, CMP8 deferred the issue to be dealt with as part of the CDM M&P review.

To avoid conflicts of interest of auditors and project developers, and to preserve the integrity of the CDM by ensuring that excess CERs due to deficiencies are compensated, the revised CDM M&P should:

- **Establish rules and procedures under which DOEs are assigned and paid** by a UNFCCC body and where CDM project developers pay validation and verification fees to that body
- Establish rules for dealing with **significant deficiencies in validation, verification and certification reports**
- **Establish a grievance mechanism** for cases when there is probable cause that a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) may not have performed its duties in accordance with the rules or requirements of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and/or the Executive Board.

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About Carbon Market Watch A programme of *Nature Code - Centre of Development and Environment*, Carbon Market Watch scrutinises carbon markets and advocates for fair and effective climate protection. The watchdog initiative is comprised by member organisations across the globe and coordinates a network of more than 800 members in more than 70 countries. Carbon Market Watch is active at European, international and grassroots levels to advocate for stronger environmental and social integrity of carbon markets. For more information, visit www.carbonmarketwatch.org