

The EU Emissions Trading System Insights into the latest political developments

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Our background

Carbon Market Watch (formally CDM Watch est. 2009) was established in 2012 to scrutinise carbon market mechanisms.

We work on 3 levels:

- International climate negotiations UNFCCC/ICAO
- EU climate policy EU's Emissions Trading System and Effort Sharing Decision
- Carbon Market Watch Network over 800 members in 70 countries. Our civil society partners play an active role in shaping the carbon market debate.

Some of you may know us from our earlier campaigns on the HFC-23 debate that successfully removed these highly potent and profitable credits from the EU ETS.





Content

- The EU's 2020 and 2030 climate framework
- The problems and solutions for the EU ETS
- Carbon leakage: myth or reality?







Elements of the 2020 climate framework

The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS):

EU's carbon market covering 11.000 installations (around 40% of EU's GHG emissions) from the power sector and industrial sectors

The Effort Sharing Decision (ESD):

EU legislation that sets emissons reductions targets for sectors not covered under the EU ETS (around 60% of EU's climate emissions), including the transport, building and agriculture sector











Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF):

Excluded from EU's 2020 climate objectives









The EU ETS' role in the overall climate and energy policy framework: it cannot do the job alone







The EU's 2030 climate policies: what you can expect in the next year(s)

Jan 2014: Commission presents 2030 climate + energy package, including:

- GHG reduction target for domestic EU emissions of 40% in 2030
- ETS reform proposal to enact a Market Stability Reserve

Oct 2014: Heads of States reach agreement on main elements of the 2030 climate + energy package including confirmation of the 2030 domestic GHG reduction target.

Early 2015: Commission presents new legislation to implement the 2030 climate target. For the EU ETS, this includes:

- Changing the percentage by which the caps are reduced each year to bring the EU ETS in line with the 2030 GHG target.
- Introducing provisions to reduce the potential risk of carbon leakage in the post-2020 period.





The EU ETS: why the MSR is not enough

- 1. The large oversupply of CO₂ allowances undermines the 2030 climate target
- 2. The inflow of carbon offsets has crowded out domestic investments in clean technologies
- 3. The EU ETS currently fails to reach EU's long-term climate objective







Problem 1: large oversupply of CO₂ allowances

By 2020: 3.2-3.9 billion surplus under ETS + ESD

Under the EU ETS :

3000

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- **2.6 billion** surplus allowances
- **1.6 billion** of these are offset _ credits



Under the ESD :

- **0.6 1.35 billion** surplus allowances
- up to 0.75 billion of these are offset credits

The potential amount of surplus in the ESD by 2020



surplus (million ton CO2-eq)



By comparison: the yearly emissions of the EU-28 Member States: 4.5 billion CO₂-eq

Problem 1: carry-over of oversupply threatens the 2030 target

- The total oversupply (ETS+ESD) of 3.2-3.9 billion when carried-over could mean that a 40% GHG target represents only 26% - 29% GHG reductions.
- Under the EU Emissions Trading System, the 2.6 billion surplus is <u>automatically</u> banked into the post-2020 period, transforming the surplus allowances into future rights to pollute

[Under the Effort Sharing Decision, there is no automatic carry-over of surplus]







The Market Stability Reserve will not do the trick

The Market Stability Reserve (e.g. automatic backloading) does not reduce the surplus as it will return the allowances from the reserve to the carbon market over time



Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon





The solution: permanently remove surplus allowances

Complement the Market Stability Reserve with cancellation of surplus allowances. This also leads to a more stable carbon price development

Proposal:

- Earlier start date (2017)
- Cancellation of surplus allowances -



Permanent cancellation + early start date

Orange line = removal 900 million allowances + start 2017

Grey line = Commission proposal





Problem 2: the large inflow of carbon offsets









The solution: promote domestic action by disallowing carbon offsets post-2020

Under the EU ETS:

 \rightarrow Carbon offsets crowd out domestic investments that increase EU's competitiveness

In general:

→ Demand for offsets under a 2015 int. agreement is problematic because all countries are expected to contribute to the global effort (risk of double counting)

→ The EU has **climate finance obligations** so public climate budget of MS may not be best spent on offsets with questionable benefits







Problem 3: the EU ETS is not in line with EU's 2°C pathway

Each year the EU ETS cap is reduced by a certain percentage: the so-called linear reduction factor (LRF). This is currently 1.74% so that each year the cap is reduced by 38 million CO_2 allowances.

To implement EU's 2030 GHG target, this percentage needs to be increased from 2020 onwards.

Problem: the percentage proposed by the Commission fails to reach EU's long-term climate objective



The solution: bring the EU ETS in line with EU's 2°C pathway

<u>EU's low-carbon roadmap (EU ETS):</u> -88% to -92% reductions by 2050 compared to 2005 -43% to -48% reductions by 2030 compared to 2005





After 2020, the LRF needs to be increased to 2.6% to be in line with the objective of keeping climate change below 2°C. This is still consistent with a 40% GHG target.



Carbon leakage: carbon can only leak if there is a country where it can leak to...





[The World Bank (2014), State and Trends of Carbon Pricing]



Carbon leakage: transfer of money from taxpayers to industry

During 2005-2008, industry gained windfall profits in the order of <u>14 billion euros</u> at the expense of taxpayers (CE Delft, 2010)





"No evidence detected for the occurrence of carbon leakage as defined by the ETS Directive in the period of application of the EU ETS, 2005-2012" Ecorys, 2013



Europe is falling behind in deploying low-carbon technologies

Energy consumption per tonne of cement clinker above benchmark in 2011



Carbon Market Watch

Cement production is particularly efficient in some Asian countries.





Europe is at a turning point ...

... which future for the EU ETS?



In 42 comparises and associations above represent more than 427-billion furnover, 42-billion material under management and 33-billion employees. We cover a volk expectrum of industry ranging from power generators to institutional investors, technology divelopers, large ener consuming industry and many more. We call for urgent action to correct elurge's calion mark We exit Members of the European Parliament to volte. However, its effectiveness has been undernied in fouror of the Environment Committee report on the surplice of allowators. The current cables porce porce availability of the surplice of the surplice of allowators. The current cables porce profile "axikualing" amendment. The EU ETs was monotone. Without agreement on the backlose designed to there more cost efficient environ in order. generatives gas emissions in fine with the EU's 2500 term survival of the EU's 2500 term the fully allowators. Teoretories of mentations in fine with the EU's 2500 term survival profile prior and Environ 48 for Horder as packnowl reactional regulations.

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How to fix the EU ETS?

As part of the MSR proposal:

Permanently remove surplus allowances to stop them from turning into future rights to pollute

As part of the ETS revision:

- Disallow the use of international offsets post-2020 as it crowds out domestic investments
- Change the linear reduction factor to 2.6% to bring the EU ETS in line with EU's 2°C pathway
- > Let the polluter pay and stop windfall profits through free allocation

▶ Reject the carbon leakage list for the 2015-2019 period









Thank you!

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